

From *The Punitive Society* to *Discipline and Punish*: The Hidden Marxism in Foucault's View of Power

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ABSTRACT

From the history of madness to criminology, and from the archaeology of knowledge to the study of power, "power" is one of the most discussed topics in Michel Foucault's research. Foucault is skilled at analyzing power from a micro-perspective and is credited with founding biopolitics. His work *Discipline and Punish* delves deeply into this issue. While Foucault's ideas were influenced by numerous Western philosophers, he claimed to be a "disciple of Nietzsche" (Du Xiaozhen, 2002: 523) and undeniably inherited many of Nietzsche's methods and thoughts. However, in *Discipline and Punish*, besides Nietzsche, we can also detect a hidden Marxism. Looking back to *The Punitive Society*, we observe the use of concepts such as economic base, morality, and alienation.

Keywords: Power, *The Punitive Society*, *Discipline and Punish*, Marxism

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of "power" has been a hot topic of discussion among scholars in various fields of social sciences for a long time. From politics, law, and economics to philosophy, from colonialism, structuralism to postmodernism and deconstruction, various perspectives and theories abound, yet no one has been able to provide a universally applicable definition of "power". One of the most outstanding French philosophers of the 20th century, Michel Foucault, clearly stated that "we still know very little about the function and operation of power in society". Although power has run throughout his academic career, Foucault asserted that many issues cannot be separated from this concept. While researching madness and crime, Foucault conducted extensive analyses of power, deliberately avoiding political categories, and discussing the production and exercise of power through the "net of power" that pervades everyday life. *Discipline and Punish* is one of his major works that explores the production of power.

2. FOUCAULT'S VIEW OF POWER

Foucault frequently reiterated: power is transparent and needs no explanation. Therefore, he

never defined power but only analyzed it. In the 1970s, Foucault engaged in a series of political activities, which deepened his thinking about the issue of power and its underlying structures. This also led to the creation of his most important work during this period—*Discipline and Punish*. In his research on prisons, he realized that everything is connected to one fundamental question: What is power? Or more precisely, how is power exercised?

Foucault argued that "ideology" is unsuitable for explaining power because it stands in opposition to truth. Truth, for Foucault, is knowledge, statements, and something value-neutral, while ideology is "everything that prevents the generation of truthful discourse". (Rabinow, 1984: 60) Furthermore, ideology always points toward the order of a particular subject, which, in comparison to the material and economic factors serving as its foundation, holds a secondary position. If the subject is still in a determined position, it becomes difficult for them to take a leading role in the power that governs society.

Foucault also rejected defining power as a "repressive" force, insisting that power is far more than just prohibiting or preventing people from doing something. Although he used this concept in his research on madness and sexuality, where it

seemed closely aligned with power, he affirmed that real power is much more complex than simply being "repressive". At the very least, repression cannot explain the production of power. Therefore, repression, as a form of power, is more applicable in the judicial realm, where laws always say "no", enforcing prohibitions in a passive manner. In many other fields of society, power can also be seductive, can create knowledge, produce discourse, and manifest other positive forms. For example, in *Discipline and Punish*, he uses the case of prisons to prove that, at certain times, power is more reliant on observation than punishment. Thus, repression can only be one function of power, not its defining characteristic.

In a 1972 interview with Gilles Deleuze, Foucault stated: "It is still unclear: who exercises power? And where is power exercised? ... We know that power is not in the hands of rulers. Of course, the concept of the 'ruling class' is not very clear and has not been fully developed." (Foucault, 2003: 28) Foucault believed that power is not about "ownership," but about "exercise". It exists in action. In *Discipline and Punish*, power is analyzed in intricate detail, produced through a series of complex techniques, and extended across various domains of society, operating subtly and covertly. Here, Foucault's power is a form of biopolitics or microphysics of power, a form of micro power. It is within this dimension that the knowledge-power system is established.

Foucault's analysis shows that the problem of power is often grounded in another concept: truth (which, for Foucault, is also knowledge). One could say that his focus is on the effects of power and the production of truth. Power produces knowledge, and knowledge in turn gives discourse power and authority. For Foucault, the boundary between knowledge and power, which intellectuals have worked hard to delineate, is often crossed. He argues, "In the humanities, the development of knowledge is inextricably linked to the exercise of power." (Rabinow, 1984: 31) Contemporary "specialized intellectuals"—those who study specific fields and possess specialized knowledge—produce specific forms of knowledge within their domains. Their status grants them the power to speak, and their discourse generates effects of power because it includes knowledge. Specialized intellectuals' knowledge is limited to their field, but at times, it can concern issues related to all of humanity (e.g., nuclear knowledge), and their discourse can exercise universal power.

We can see that Foucault's view of power is quite complex, but its focus remains on: the effects of power and the production of truth. In *Discipline and Punish*, we will observe how power is produced and how it operates.

3. BIOPOLITICS

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault examines the birth of the prison from a historical perspective. The prison was neither an independent creation of the judicial system in its development, nor the natural evolution of penal practices. In other words, it was not an exclusive product of the judicial field. Its emergence is intricately connected to the practices and techniques used by various social institutions: by the late 18th century, it was finally decided to make imprisonment the basic form of punishment, integrating various techniques to fix people in specific spaces (cells), force them to perform certain actions (labor, training), and adhere to specific routines (schedules). The prison model incorporated the Christian schools of the late 17th century, military barracks, and the large factory model that emerged in the 18th century.

This model is a complete system of discipline, surveillance, shaping, and control, within which power operates. "Knowledge" is formed in the process of power's operation, and the strategies, networks, mechanisms, and all the means through which these decisions are implemented are analyzed in meticulous detail. Various factors play an indispensable role in disciplinary power: spatial distribution isolates people and provides mobility, avoiding the possibility of group effects, and ensuring the exercise of power; labor forces individuals to obey and adapt to certain production models, while reshaping them through interaction with tools and machines: power creates a composite of body-weapon, body-tool, and body-machine; (Foucault, 2003: 173) schedules maximize the use of time, extracting time and increasing the efficiency of human utilization, contributing to the full implementation of power; discipline stipulates punishment and reward, functioning as the mechanism to ensure the enforcement of control through surveillance.

Thus, it is evident that factors such as space, time, labor, and discipline cooperate with each other, through which power is produced. The combination of these various factors creates a "productive power" greater than the sum of individual factors, enabling the effective exercise of

power. In the 19th century, Jeremy Bentham's¹ design of the "Panopticon" brought a new technology to this prison model, where "panoptic surveillance" was applied to monitoring.

This surveillance is both top-down and horizontally radiating from the center to the periphery. It continuously exerts its effects, and under the constant supervision of an observer whose identity is unknown, the web of power covers every corner of the prison, penetrating the body of the observed, instilling a sense of self-restraint in the observed individuals. This power is internalized by the object of power through subconscious mechanisms or what Pierre Bourdieu referred to as "habitus", thus influencing behavior, and making individuals docile. The entire process can be summarized as the production—coverage—penetration—implantation of power. When power shifts from external to internal, its efficiency increases: it becomes more time- and energy-efficient, more effective, and thus more modern.

At the same time, during the process of surveillance, detailed observation of the observed generates knowledge. Knowledge derived from actual observation, once issued by the observer wielding power, is akin to results derived from experiments conducted by experts in a laboratory. It is empirical knowledge, possessing scientific rigor and authority. Thus, knowledge becomes truth, acquiring universal significance, which, in turn, can serve the process of power reproduction and further enhance the legitimacy of power. Knowledge—discourse—power forms an unassailable loop. Knowledge is the basis on which power is accepted, and the power mechanism ensures a continuous acquisition of knowledge.

It is necessary to point out that terms such as "discipline", "supervision" and "panoptic surveillance" may sound disturbing, yet they are value-neutral concepts (Legrand, 2007). They are merely means by which the world's order is formed; they themselves are neither right nor wrong. Even if they did not exist, the subject's practice could never be fully liberated from constraints. Thus, we need not critique them or discuss how to escape from these disciplinary mechanisms.

1. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), a British legal theorist, philosopher, and social reformer, designed the "panopticon" model for prisons. His goal was to achieve uninterrupted surveillance of prisoners through architectural structure. Although this model was never realized during his lifetime, it had a significant influence on later prison architecture and social discipline theories. Foucault coined the term "Panopticism" to describe this concept.

The prison is the culmination of various disciplinary techniques, representing absolute and total control: prisoners are confined to specific spaces at particular times, perform designated actions, and any deviation results in severe punishment. However, Foucault's choice of the prison as his object of study was not merely intended to demonstrate the function of the prison or the mechanisms through which power operates within it. Rather, it was meant to adopt a broader and more distant perspective from which to observe how mechanisms of surveillance, the effects of power, and their concrete operations take place across a wide range of institutions, such as factories, schools, hospitals, and military barracks. The prison is merely a microcosm of society, a concentrated mirror reflecting the intertwined power relations that permeate it. Society itself thus becomes a "panoptic society". Foucault asserts: "The prison is like the factory, the school, the barracks, the hospital, and they are all like the prison." His political anatomy analysis halts here. But where does such micro power originate, and for whom does it serve? How can this prison model and the power structures within it incorporate other functional, productive, and service-oriented institutions into its discourse system? What common features do they share? How does this concept gain universality and legitimacy in society? Is it merely because these institutions share the aforementioned divisions of space, the arrangements of time, the training of the body, and "panoptic" surveillance? Although Foucault's dissection of power is already deeply profound, this Nietzschean genealogical² revelation is startling, the deeper reasons had already been uncovered in his earlier work, *The Punitive Society*, and can partly be found in the Marxist conception of economic power.³

4. HIDDEN MARXISM

2. Nietzsche's genealogy is a critique of traditional metaphysics and a transcendental critique, aiming to provide a scientific new foundation for humanity. It emphasizes the historical nature of concepts, arguing that discussing concepts without their historical context is meaningless, which is especially important in discussions of moral values. Foucault and Deleuze, among others, further developed this idea, transforming it into a self-sufficient theoretical system that influenced later philosophical discussions.

3. However, in reality, Foucault did not delve into the origins and consequences of power, focusing instead on macro-level analysis. His view of power's connection to economics and politics falls within the Marxist framework of power, which he deliberately avoided. Nevertheless, his analysis in *The Punitive Society*, based on his 1972–1973 lectures at the Collège de France, clearly reveals his inheritance of Marx's ideas.

The production of power in everyday life, the struggle for power, and the formation of a disciplinary society—does this not contradict the "freedom" that was advocated and pursued during the Enlightenment? Why does discipline function across all domains of capitalist society? First, it is noted that discipline and punishment increase a person's power (from a utilitarian economic perspective, this is the person's usefulness), while at the same time diminishing it (from a political perspective, this is the person's docility). (Foucault, 2003: 156) However, in different fields, a person's usefulness only serves to enhance the efficiency of the institution to which they belong, and this function is bounded, specific to each domain and institution. The universally present usefulness does not guarantee that conflicts will not arise between institutions with differing functions, and thus it cannot serve as the internal factor that makes Foucault's disciplinary society cohesive. What about "docility"? Its function seems also limited to making the disciplined submit to their employer or superior, loyal to their personal identity. Docility to one side may very well be submission to the authoritarian power of the other. Similarly, like usefulness, "docility" cannot abstract the result of discipline into a characteristic that is universally applicable across society, devoid of distinction and opposition. To explain this, we attempt to trace back to Foucault's view of power.

In fact, in his slightly earlier work *The Punitive Society*⁴, power is far more than just a product of action. Foucault explicitly discusses the repressive, political, and economic aspects of power, revealing the Marxist view of power that is hidden in *Discipline and Punish*. In other words, after 1973, Foucault's view of disciplinary power shifted, and he tried to remove the Marxist influence on his thinking, but this transformation was not complete.

4.1 Time

In Foucault's prison-form (forme-prison), the concept of time is introduced:

"Moreover, it (the prison) is capable of quantifying punishment through time. In industrial society, there is a form of imprisonment by wages. This form constitutes its 'self-justification' in economic terms, making the prison seem like a form of compensation." (Foucault, 2003: 261)

"The penal system makes the prison-form... similar to the wage-form (forme-salaire): just as a certain amount of labor time earns wages, conversely, a certain amount of free time is the price for committing a crime." (Foucault, 2018: 91)

In the two quotations above, we see nearly identical expressions. The use of time to quantify punishment, the deprivation of free time through imprisonment transformed into an economic punishment, with wages becoming the economic model in penal practice. Here, time is the sole variable, making the quantification of punishment seem scientific and rational. Prisoners labor as they would in a factory, yet cannot receive wages; the labor output is instead used to compensate society for the damage caused by the crime. The economic model of labor management in society is applied to prisons, illustrating that "time" is introduced into both the capitalist power structure and the penal system. The prison, like capitalist society, seeks to occupy an individual's surplus time (in prison, it is the total occupation of a person's time), enacting punishment, or in other words, "exchanging time for power". By likening prison punishment to labor in capitalist society and treating time as the fundamental, hidden factor, the ownership of time equates to the ownership of economic resources and the exercise of power. This economic perspective on social issues resonates with Marx's view of society.

Marx's understanding of power was initially based on the traditional view of power as repressive and class-based, but by the time he wrote *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *Capital*, his conception of power had evolved. He argued that, in addition to the political and judicial realms, power also operates in the economic sphere, where he conducted an in-depth analysis of new forms of power. When examining the formation of commodity value and surplus value, he identified time as a key factor and created the concept of "socially necessary labor time" — "whether it is the labor contained in the means of production or the labor added by the labor power, it is all measured according to the scale of time." (Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, 2009: 228)

It is well-known that the labor time that exceeds the "socially necessary labor time" creates surplus value, which generates profit for capitalists and facilitates exploitation. Capitalists purchase labor power in the free market, which seems like a fair transaction. However, the actual labor time of workers often exceeds the time equivalent to the

4. The Punitive Society is the full translation of Foucault's 1972-1973 lectures at the Collège de France.

wages the capitalists pay for their labor. This shows that time is the hidden factor through which capital power operates in the economic realm. The fundamental role of economics is self-evident, and the economic base determines the superstructure. Marx's ally and ideological successor, Engels, also believed that "the entire process can be explained purely by economic causes, and there is no need to invoke plunder, violence, the state, or any political intervention." (Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, 2009: 171) Economics is the internal determining factor for the emergence, development, and demise of capitalist production relations, revealing ultimate power and power relations. Everything is controlled by economics; the development of productive forces and the pursuit of economic benefits are the ultimate goals of all disciplinary measures in capitalist society, and capital exerts control over biopolitics.

Therefore, it can be said that Foucault's analysis of the time—economy—punishment—power relationship, though conducted on a micro level, aligns with Marx's critique of political economy. The veiled political operations, economic means, and repressive power in *Discipline and Punish* are clearly reflected in *The Punitive Society*:

"Similarly, we can analyze both the system of criminal punishment and the system of labor discipline through the relationship between life time and political power: the punishment of time is reflected in the continuity between the clock in the factory, the timers on the assembly line, and the calendar in the prison." (Foucault, 2018: 93)

This statement reflects the control over life's time and the tension between time and power. From this, we can clearly see that Foucault's initial perspective on prisons, punishment, and power was grounded in an economic viewpoint, borrowing concepts such as labor time, wages, and ownership. In the West, Marxism is often criticized for analyzing everything from an economic standpoint, reducing all issues—exploitation, power, suffering—to economic problems. Foucault also raised the question, "Can an analysis of various powers be reduced, in one way or another, to an economic analysis?" (Foucault, 2010: 10) His concept of power is based on action, but in reality, we find that he never fully escaped the political economy context on which Marx's theory of social power rests.

4.2 Morality

It is necessary to focus on the primary functions and principles of the prison: on one hand, imprisonment, and on the other hand, moral reform. Imprisonment creates the power relations mentioned earlier, while moral reform refers to the rehabilitation of the prisoner.

As previously discussed, the discipline of the body shapes useful and docile individuals, using methods similar to those in factories, schools, and military barracks: spatial distribution, the organization of time, coordination of discipline, and the assurance of surveillance. This kind of discipline is universally applied in Foucault's "prison network" (military barracks, schools, factories, reformatories, labor camps, etc.), and in this "taming" process, Foucault introduces the concept of morality:

"What affects the prisoner... is also conscience itself. This is a profound conquest, not a superficial taming; it is a 'moral' transformation, not a change of attitude."⁵ (Foucault, 2003: 271)

It is generally believed that many crimes stem from human agitation, laxity, and laziness. By arranging labor for prisoners, habits of order and obedience can be cultivated. Prisons provide prisoners with small wages, which leads them to develop the concept of private property and understand what is "earned by their own labor". Work ethics emerge as part of this moral reform. In addition to labor, there are also specific moral admonitions. Foucault agrees with Calhoun's view that "the penal system is based on moral concepts", and moral education thus becomes part of micro power, with its application and importance extending to society at large. Foucault discusses in *The Punitive Society* a number of moral reform groups in 18th-century Britain, whose rules and objectives were aimed at counteracting moral decay, encouraging virtue, and advocating a professional mission.⁶ These groups worked to morally discipline and control the populace—for example, forbidding people from indulging in leisure on

5. In addition to this type of statement, certain illustrations on pages 188-189 further reflect the moral education in prisons: for example, illustration 28, the chapel of the Fleury prison, where the evils of drinking were preached.

6. These ideas are rooted in the Protestant ethics spirit that emerged in European society in the 17th century, promoting virtues such as work ethic, utilitarianism, and lifestyle moderation, all of which significantly contributed to the economic development of capitalist society.

Sundays, or prohibiting drunkenness and gambling, as these were considered sources of idleness and inefficiency. Thus, how does this moral order in the prison, intended to reform prisoners, extend to society? Calhoun first gave Foucault the insight that the target group of these regulations was the lower classes. Legal prohibitions can have a positive effect on individuals, leading to moral transformation or upliftment.

In capitalist society, the lower class is the dominated working class, living on the margins of poverty. From the perspective of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat is ignorant, gullible, full of bad habits, and morally corrupt. These are not within the scope of judicial punishment, yet they are the irreconcilable enemies of diligence, work, and wisdom, which makes the bourgeoisie both despise and feel threatened by them. This threat does not manifest in illegal activities, but in the following way: if workers are all lazy, not diligent enough, and do not enjoy work, it will affect the wealth of the capitalists. Of course, this does not mean the direct plunder or destruction of their existing wealth, but rather "engaging in illegal activities with their own bodies, with the labor power that the employer believes to own, because in the free market, employers pay wages to purchase labor power, and workers are obliged to provide labor." (Foucault, 2018: 219-220) From this perspective, they are said to have usurped the capitalist's property—not tangible wealth, but one of the conditions that the bourgeoisie uses to create productive forces: the worker's body. Therefore, to eliminate this danger, workers must have good morals, healthy bodies, and be loyal to their posts, working diligently. To this end, in addition to social groups providing moral education, factories often sign labor contracts with workers, establish labor codes, and maintain individual files. These specific measures intervene in the time outside the worker's labor by means of morality, to prevent the "illegal wasteful behavior" of the workers.

Moral discipline includes a certain degree of coercion, and those who violate it will be punished. This punishment becomes a powerful safeguard for the labor relationship. Whether through social groups or the factory's own disciplinary means, these are forms of self-surveillance within society, as well as the exercise of power within society. In many capitalist countries, some regulations from moral education groups have even been incorporated into the judicial system (such as the 19th-century laws prohibiting vagrancy). With legal guarantees, morality and punishment work together

to penalize the disruption of capitalist production relations, and political power is also involved.

The wages paid by capitalists purchase the workers' labor time, but moral supervision also controls workers' life time. On one hand, life time is organized according to productive time, so that individuals only have the right to organize their lives outside of labor time. On the other hand, moral supervision ensures that individuals cannot freely control their own lives, but are instead subject to the demands of social groups or institutions like factories, passively planning the time that originally belonged to the individual in order to preserve or reproduce labor power. Personal time must comply with and serve productive time, or in economic terms, it serves the purpose of capital accumulation for the capitalists. "The issue of industrial society is mainly that the personal time purchased through wages is incorporated into the production mechanism in the form of labor power", and the power structure "synthesizes life into productive force". (Foucault, 2018: 296)

Thus, Foucault's introduction of moral factors into the discipline and shaping of individuals shows how power serves the production model. Micro-power becomes the foundation of both political and economic power, and analyzing the function of moral discipline from the perspective of production relations and economic foundations aligns closely with Marx's view of political economic power. The latter argues that capitalists also purchase workers' labor time with wages, creating value and surplus value. Workers always labor under the supervision of the capitalists, and their labor belongs to the capitalists. Meanwhile, capitalists also educate the proletariat through various means (such as moral education), making them accept and submit to this education, rendering them so docile that they would work 24 hours a day without resistance or even the ability to resist. "Just as the end of class ownership, in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, is the end of production itself, the end of class education, in their eyes, is the end of all education", "the education that capitalists fear losing is, for the vast majority of people, the training of people into machines". (Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, 2009: 48) By educating the proletariat through moral means, capitalists transform them into machines that devote all their lives to capitalist production.

Whether in *The Punitive Society* or *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault always maintains that "the exercise of power is not where ideology is formed".

However, no one can deny that, in any society, the state is the agent of morality. The moral education and moral punishment carried out to maintain the political and economic order of a capitalist state necessarily possess the ideological characteristics of the bourgeoisie, representing the interests and will of the ruling class. The working class, the lower strata of society, is the target of this moral influence, while the bourgeoisie can often escape such moral constraints. They can idle and be carefree while simultaneously possessing large amounts of wealth. Therefore, the introduction of the concept of "morality" clearly imprints power with a class-based stamp and inevitably imbues it with ideology. In this regard, what Marx profoundly revealed is precisely what Foucault vehemently denies, yet his works essentially express the same viewpoint.

4.3 Alienation

Both "time" and "morality" are binding factors that reveal how power operates and generates itself through them in various relationships and actions within a disciplinary society. In Foucault's view, the subject, who should be an active agent, is objectified in the process of discipline, becoming a "tool-user" or a "robot", trapped in a network of power and lacking autonomy, like a puppet controlled by strings, acting under the pull of the ropes of time, space, discipline, and surveillance. The individual no longer controls their own body; it no longer belongs to them, and this is also true in labor. This mirrors Marx's concept of alienated labor.

Marx argues that the product produced by the laborer does not belong to the laborer themselves. The product of labor becomes an alien object to the worker, opposed to labor itself, objectified and reified, which leads to the fact that "labor, for the worker, becomes something external." The more the worker produces, the more they lose; as the capitalist economy develops, the worker becomes increasingly impoverished. Therefore, the worker's life (which means activity) becomes "an activity that does not depend on them, does not belong to them, and turns against them. This is self-alienation". (Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, 2009: 160) Alienation thus means the objectification of the subject. It is evident that, for both Foucault and Marx, workers are the objects upon which power is exercised in the relations of production—they are alienated objects. Moreover, there is a common point between them: the more

powerful the alien world force becomes, the more impoverished the internal world of the individual, and the deeper the degree of alienation.

5. CONCLUSION

Thus, it is evident that the introduction of the concepts of "time" and "morality", the class-based and coercive nature of power, and the objectification of the subject ultimately reveal the hidden Marxism in Foucault's concept of "disciplinary power". Economic relations are the most fundamental issue in capitalist society, playing a crucial role in power relations, driving the functioning of power, and serving capitalist production relations. The power mechanisms discussed by Foucault are part of the type of economic power. Power is not just used to secure production; it is itself a part of production. Marx replaces the condemnation of plunder with an analysis of production, (Foucault, 1997: 37-38) while Foucault analyzes production relations through the deconstruction of power. Foucault believes that Marx's concept of power originates from the "state apparatus" perspective, (Rabinow, 1984: 57) with its most notable feature being its repressive nature. Foucault, however, is reluctant to discuss power from the ideological perspective, though he emphasizes coercion in his analysis of discipline and punishment. The difference is that this coercion has become internalized in the subjects of discipline—it is hidden rather than overt. The era of violent and bloody punishment has long passed; humanitarianism and civilization are the values advocated in contemporary society. However, the control over minds and souls remains brutally evident in capitalist society.

Power is deeply concealed in Western society, but it is most thoroughly exposed in the works of both Foucault and Marx: the so-called "political life" of the 19th century is a way for power to display its form. Many sociologists and philosophers have argued from an economic perspective, asserting that the economy plays a decisive role and is at the core of all critique. Foucault, however, believes that this critique is a return to "politics", while he deliberately avoids discussing the fundamental power relations that constitute economic relations. (Foucault, 1997: 43) In fact, Foucault read extensively from Marx's works during his philosophical studies but seldom mentioned Marx in his own works or in public, seemingly unwilling to acknowledge the influence of Marxism on his ideas. After the mid-1970s,

Foucault criticized Marxism, arguing that it contained strong ideological elements, seemingly attempting to distance himself from it. However, *The Punitive Society* (which represents his views from 1972-1973) reveals his inheritance of Marxist concepts regarding power. Foucault's view of disciplinary power underwent a significant shift after *Discipline and Punish* (post-1977), moving away from the original political economy framework into the biological realm, with a focus on biopolitics. Ultimately, from a Marxist perspective, disciplinary power is nothing more than the rule of capital, falling within the scope of political economy. Biopolitics ultimately requires clarification through political economy.

Therefore, it is precisely from the perspective of economics and production that Foucault's series of disciplinary concepts can be broadly applied to all of society and possess universal significance. In part, his view of power is an inheritance of Marxism and, at the same time, an exposure and critique of capitalist society. Foucault once candidly stated, "I often cite Marx's concepts, sentences, and articles, but I feel it is not necessary to always provide footnotes and irrelevant commentary..." (Lemke, 2017: 14) It is precisely because of this that people often overlook the influence of Marx's ideas in his research.

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